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ABSTRACT  
Out-of-pocket health payments can cause financial hardship to households, which 
may push them into poverty. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact of 
out-of-pocket health payments on households’ economic situation in Egypt using a 
national representative survey. On the other hand, the conventional poverty estimates 
do not take the effect of out-of-pocket health payments on households into account. 
Therefore, by reassessing the poverty estimates taking into account out-of-pocket 
health payments, this thesis provides new poverty estimates that reflect the poverty 
impact of out-of-pocket health payments. The thesis adopts the World Health 
Organization’s methodology in measuring the extent of catastrophic health 
expenditure and impoverishment. It uses a logit model to identify the determinants of 
catastrophic health expenditure. The quantitative analysis yields that out-of-pocket 
health payments exacerbate households’ living especially the poor and the near poor. 
The thesis suggests that 6% of households encounter catastrophic health expenditure 
in 2010. It estimates that the poverty line for a household composed of four members, 
which is the average household size, equals LE 673.8 per month. It suggests that the 
19.1% of households spend below the poverty line. However, additional 7.4% of 
households fall below the poverty line after paying for health care. In other words, the 
size of poverty in Egypt including those who are impoverished by health payment is 
26.5%. Additionally, out-of pocket health payments have exacerbated the normalized 
poverty gap by 1.4%. The econometric analysis suggests that household with chronic 
sick member and poor households are the most vulnerable to catastrophic health 
expenditure.  
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 “We face a calamity when my husband gets ill. Our life comes to a halt until he 
recovers and goes back to work” 
An Egyptian Woman quoted in “Voices of the Poor” 
“Poor people cannot improve their health status because they live day by day, and if 
they get sick they are in trouble because they have to borrow money and pay 
interest” 
A Vietnamese woman quoted in the Voices of the Poor 
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I. Introduction 
Poverty alleviation remains a major challenge for Egypt, one that has taken on 
increased salience after the January 25
th
 Revolution, which called for social justice. In 
2007, the World Bank announced that poverty is affecting two in every five citizens 
in Egypt (The World Bank, 2007). Many studies have researched poverty in Egypt, 
but very few such as (Abou-Ali, 2007) and (El Gazzar, 2009) have studied the impact 
of out-of-pocket payments (OOP) for health care on exacerbating poverty.  
OOP have become the principle mean of financing health care in Egypt. 
According to the National Health Accounts, in 2008, OOP accounted for 60% of 
health spending whereas public finance constituted 33.5%. The remainder is funded 
by donors, public firms and employer funds (Ministry of Health , Egypt, and Health 
Systems 20/20, 2010). Reliance on OOP in financing health care leaves households 
exposed to risk of incurring a large medical expense should a household member falls 
sick. Therefore, health shocks can push households into financial catastrophe resulting 
from health payments and lost earnings due to inability to work (Ke Xu, Kawabata, 
Kei, Zeramdini, & Klavus, 2003).  
On the other hand, the Seventh Round of the Egyptian Family Observatory 
Survey provided that 80% of households have at least one member covered by public 
health insurance. However, the survey pointed out that only 25% of households are 
benefiting from it due to low quality services and excessive red tape. This suggests 
that health shocks may push non-poor into poverty and exacerbate the poverty of the 
poor (The Information and Decision Support Center, 2010).  
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Catastrophic health expenditure refers to health spending that drives 
households to reduce their basic consumption or sell assets or borrow or to cut the 
consumption of other goods to pay for health care to an extent that leads to disruption 
to living standards. There are two approaches to measure the extent of catastrophic 
health expenditure: Van Doorslaer’s approach and Ke Xu’s approach. Both share the 
concept that OOP on health services should not exceed a threshold. Van Doorslaer’s 
approach suggests that OOP on health service are defined as catastrophic if they 
exceed a pre-specified fraction of household total expenditure.  On the other hand, Ke 
Xu, a researcher at the World Health Organization (WHO), suggests that OOP on 
health service are considered to be catastrophic if they exceed 40% of non-subsistence 
expenditure.    
Papers that have addressed OOP and catastrophic health expenditure in Egypt 
investigated the extent of catastrophic expenditure in Egypt using Van Doorslaer’s 
approach. There is, to my knowledge, no study that provided the extent of 
catastrophic expenditure, explored the determinants of catastrophic expenditure or 
calculated the extent of impoverished households by health payments in Egypt based 
on the Xu's methodology (Xu, 2005). Thus, this study seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature. 
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Research Question and Agenda 
The research question of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between 
OOP for health care and poverty in Egypt and to explore the implications for poverty 
reduction programming. To answer the above question, the thesis aims at achieving 
the following objectives: 
a) Provide the extent of catastrophic expenditures in Egypt using Xu’s 
approach,  
b) Identify determinants of catastrophic health expenditure in Egypt,  
c) Provide the extent of impoverished households by OOP for health care in 
Egypt, 
d) Suggest policy guidance to poverty reduction programs.   
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II. Literature Review 
In the health care financing market, government intervention is a common 
remedy for market failure since market forces alone do not produce the most desirable 
outcomes from social welfare perspective. As health shocks increase households’ 
vulnerability and disrupt their livelihood. Therefore, government intervention is 
required to correct market failure and to provide health and social protection for the 
poor.     
  Xu et al stressed on the importance of government health financing in 
protecting households from financial catastrophe. They studied the relationship 
between the incidence of catastrophic health expenditure and the size of public health 
spending in 89 countries. They found a negative correlation between the extent of 
catastrophic expenditure and the size of public health spending (Ke Xu, Carrin, & 
Ana Mylena, 2007).   
A. Government Health Financing  
Generally, there are two schemes to finance health care: General Taxation 
(GT) and Social Health Insurance (SHI). Under GT, the government provides the 
population with free health care or at a very low price. Low and middle income 
countries have limited ability to raise sufficient funding from taxes to meet all health 
financial requirements due to the high rates of poverty and to the large size of 
informal economy.  
In essence, SHI is a form of prepayment mechanism that collects regular 
financial contributions for health so that they can be used in the case of illness. It 
seeks to spread the financial risk associated with illness across individuals. It 
separates between access to health care service and the ability to pay for it, as SHI 
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contributions are based on the ability to pay while access to services are based on the 
need. In essence, SHI’s funds are separate from taxes and they are managed by an 
autonomous institution. However, mixed financing is common in many countries, 
where segment of a population is covered by health insurance and the rest is covered 
by free health care (The World Health Organization, 2005). For example, public 
employees and school students in Egypt are covered by public health insurance and 
the remainder of the population is covered by free health care. 
WHO suggested that there is no one best prepayment mechanism that fits all 
countries in terms of raising funds or protecting households from financial catastrophe 
resulting from health shocks (The World Health Organization, 2005). Since countries 
at different stages of development are facing different kinds of problems and they 
have to make decisions regarding raising funds, pooling risk and how to provide 
service given their political contexts, social structure, and economic system. 
Therefore, there is no consensus on which prepayment mechanism offers better 
protection. There is, however, a wide consensus in literature arguing that reducing 
reliance on OOP in financing health care is the key to protect households from 
financial catastrophe resulting from illness (Ke Xu, Carrin, & Ana Mylena, 2007). Xu 
et al. explored the determinants of catastrophic health expenditure in 59 countries. 
They concluded that the proportion of government health spending to total health 
spending (as opposed to OOP share of total health spending) is the main factor 
explaining the prevalence of catastrophic health expenditures across countries (Xu, 
Kawabata, Kei, Zeramdini, & Klavus, 2003).    
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B. Health Shocks, Coping Strategies and Economic Consequences  
Poor households develop strategies to cope with illness. These strategies aim 
to sustain the economic viability of the household. There are strategies that deal with 
mobilizing funds to meet direct costs such as borrowing or selling assets. Other 
strategies deal with indirect cost such as intra-household labor substitution. The 
ability of households to deal with health shocks depends on their assets portfolio, in 
addition to the type, severity, duration of illness and the family members affected.  
Leive and Xu explored how households in 15 African countries
1
 coped with 
health shocks. They also questioned whether households coping strategies vary 
significantly between financing outpatient service, inpatient service and routine care. 
These countries are characterized by low government health spending and lack of 
health insurance. The average public health spending in these countries is nearly 40% 
of total health spending. They developed a logit model to identify the variables that 
are associated with selling assets, borrowing or both to finance health care. The 
dependant variable is a binary variable such that it equals one when a household used 
a coping strategy (borrowing or selling assets or both) and zero if a household relied 
on their income or saving to finance health care. In order to permit comparison across 
the 15 countries, the logit model runs separately for each country. The results 
suggested that in 12 countries high inpatient spending increased the likelihood of 
borrowing or selling assets. Moreover, it pointed out that rich quintiles were less 
likely to use coping strategies compared to poor quintiles. There was no significant 
difference in the coping behaviors among the bottom three income quintiles. Urban 
                                                          
1
  The 15 African countries are Burkina Faso, Chad, the Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Namibia, Senegal, Swaziland, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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households were less likely to use coping strategies than rural households. The study 
reported that in 11 countries male headed households were less likely to borrow or 
sell assets. It suggested that households headed by senior member (above 60 years) 
were more likely to borrow or sell assets (Leive & Xu, 2008).   
Wagstaff explored the response of household income, consumption and 
medical care spending to health shocks. Additionally, he explored the extent to which 
household consumption is protected from health shocks. He measured household 
health shocks by a recent death of working-age household member, a long inpatient 
spell, and a recent sizable drop in the Body Mass Index (BMI) of household head. The 
study concluded that the death of working-age household member negatively affects 
earned income particularly at urban areas. However, other health shocks (drop in BMI 
or inpatient) do not significantly reduce earned income. This suggests that households 
used coping strategies such as intra-household labor substitution to deal with health 
shocks other than a death. Moreover, hospitalization significantly increased medical 
spending particularly for the uninsured than insured. Results suggested that deaths and 
drop in BMI of household head did not significantly affect medical spending. The 
study suggested that health shocks reduced the per capita food consumption within 
households. Furthermore, it pointed out that some health shocks increased expenditure 
on electricity and housing for the rural sample while cutting expenditure on durable 
goods. Wagstaff interpreted this change in consumption pattern as a trial to provide 
sick household member with comfortable housing during recovery (Wagstaff, 2007).  
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C. Catastrophic Health Expenditure and Impoverishment  
1. Catastrophic Health Expenditure  
Xu et al. identified three preconditions for catastrophic health expenditure: 
expensive health care, poor population and the lack or the failure of health insurance 
to cover health expense (Ke Xu, Kawabata, Kei, Zeramdini, & Klavus, 2003). There 
are two common approaches to measure catastrophic expenditure. Van Doorslaer et 
al. (2007) argued that catastrophic health expenditure occurs when OOP on health 
exceed some fraction of household income or total expenditure in a given period, 
usually within a year. An alternative definition was offered by Xu, et al. (2003), 
which stated that catastrophic health expenditure occurs when OOP on health exceed 
40% of household’s capacity to pay. They defined the household’s capacity to pay as 
remaining income after basic subsistence needs have met. These two definitions have 
two limitations.  Firstly, they do not capture the impact of illness on households who 
cannot meet the treatment’s expense. Though, the loss resulting from forging 
treatment could be severe. Secondly, they do not capture lost earnings due to inability 
to work or other changes in expenditure patterns that arise from illness. It is difficult 
to capture these impacts in Egypt, as there is to my knowledge no data could support 
such study. 
2. Impoverishment and Poverty Estimates   
Impoverishment by OOP occurs when households who are considered to be 
non-poor (average consumption above the national poverty line) are pushed into 
poverty after payment for health care (average consumption after payment for health 
care is below the national poverty line). Van Doorslaer et al. (2006) examined 
whether OOP on health exacerbate poverty in 11 countries in Asia. They obtained 
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data on OOP from nationally representative surveys, and subtracted these OOP from 
total household income. Thereby they calculated the poverty estimates (poverty 
headcount and poverty gap) after making OOP. They compared poverty estimates 
after making OOP to the conventional poverty estimates. They found that poverty 
estimates after paying for health care were much higher than the conventional 
estimates, ranging from an additional 1.2% in Vietnam to 3.8% in Bangladesh 
(Doorslaer, et al., 2006). They concluded that OOP are likely to inflate the extent of 
poverty. Therefore, poverty alleviation policies should take OOP into account.   
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III. Methodology 
The adopted methodology includes two approaches. First, the thesis reviews 
literature on Egypt’s health system financing with the intention of assessing the 
Government of Egypt’s ability to protect households from catastrophic health 
expenditure. Second, the thesis uses quantitative analysis to provide the extent of 
catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment. Additionally, a multi variant 
logit model is used to identify the determinants of catastrophic health expenditure. 
The description of the quantitative methodology follows.    
Data Source 
The raw data used in this work come from the Eighth Round of the Egyptian 
Family Observatory Survey conducted by the Information and Decision Support 
Center (IDSC) in September 2010. It provides disaggregated raw data on households’ 
social status, educational status, economic status, health status, and demographic 
information. The thesis uses the Eighth Round because it is the latest national 
representative survey. The sample was drawn randomly from Egyptian households. It 
has been drawn from all governorates except the border governorates.  The sample 
has covered rural and urban areas based on proportional representation. The sample 
size is 10,550 households, weighted to be nationally representative (The Information 
and Decision Support Center, 2010). 
Data 
The following variables are withdrawn from the survey to calculate the extent 
of catastrophic health expenditure: 
 Food expenditure (     ) refers to amount spent on all food and drinks.   
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 Food expenditure share (        ) is given by monthly amount spent on 
food and drinks divided by total household expenditure. It is reported in the 
survey as a percentage of total household expenditure.  
 Total household expenditure (    ) consists of all monthly payments on all 
goods and services.  It is reported in the survey in Egyptian pounds.    
 Household size (      h) refers to the number of members in the household.   
 Household weight ( ) is used to make sample representative. It is used on the 
survey to reflect the degree to which households with their socio-economic 
characteristics are under or over sampled in the survey.  
 OOP on health refers to the payments made by households at the point they 
receive health services. It includes treatment payments and medication 
payments. OOP are net of any insurance reimbursement.  
Analysis 
A household with catastrophic health expenditure is a household that has OOP 
equaling or exceeding 40% of household capacity to pay (   ). Capacity to pay is 
defined as the difference between total household expenditure and subsistence 
expenditure (  ).    is calculated using Xu’s methodology and is detailed below.   
First, large households gain from economics of scale of household. Thus, to take into 
account the effect of economy of scale of household,         will be adjusted using 
the following expression: 
               
 
 
Such that         is the equivalent household size and         is the actual 
household size and   reflects the economy of scale. Previous studies suggest that the 
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value of   equals 0.56 (Xu, 2005). Second, adjusted food expenditure (       ) is 
calculated by dividing food expenditure (     ) by       :  
        
     
       
 
Third, a relative poverty line is constructed by identifying          that are in the 
45
th 
(      ) to 55th (      ) percentile range across the whole sample. Then the 
weighted average of         in the 45th to 55th percentile range is calculated as:  
             
           
   
 
Such that                        
Lastly, to get     for a household, poverty line is multiplied by its        : 
                         
A household is considered to be facing catastrophic health expenditures when OOP on 
health equal or exceed 40% of its    . Predictive Analytics Software Statistics 18 
(PAWS 18) will be used to provide these measures. 
Econometric Analysis  
   A logit regression model is used to investigate the determinants of catastrophic 
health expenditures. This model is adopted from WHO’s report (Xu, 2005). A new 
dummy variable is created to identify households with catastrophic health expenditure 
in the pooled dataset.        
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The binary dependent variable (y) equals one when a household encounters 
catastrophic health expenditure and zero otherwise. The logit model is applied to three 
different sets: the poorest quintile, the richest quintile and all households to explore 
the determinants of catastrophic health expenditure. Table 1 lists the suggested 
independent variables and their description.     
Table 1- List of Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variable 
Description  
X1 Place of Residence (1, urban household and 0, rural household) 
X2  Sex of household head  (1, male and 0, female) 
X3 Working status of household head (1, employed and 0, unemployed) 
X4 Household head education (1, educated 0, uneducated) 
X5 Private Insurance (1, at least one member insured 0, none) 
X6 Expenditure quintile (dummy variable with several categories) 
X7 Household size 
X8 Age Dependency Ratio (number of aged member(s) to number of 
working age member(s) within household) 
X9 Number of public health insured member(s) divided by hhsize 
X10 Number of chronic ill member(s) divided by hhsize 
X11 Number of children less than 5 years old 
 
In fact, interpreting   is rather difficult. The odds ratio,    ( ), is therefore 
used to describe the partial relation. In the model,   reflects the probability of a 
household facing catastrophic expenditure to the probability of being non-facing 
catastrophic expenditure. Therefore, an odds ratio of one reflects an equal probability 
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of occurrence. Odds greater than one suggest that facing catastrophic expenditure is 
more likely than not facing catastrophic expenditure. The converse is true.   
Impoverishment and Poverty Gap 
 The conventional methodology of measuring poverty defines a poverty line 
expressed in monetary values. Households in poverty are those whose level of 
expenditure is below the poverty line (The World Bank, 2011). Additionally, the 
normalized poverty gap is commonly used to reflect the intensity of poverty. It 
estimates the amount to which households fall below the poverty line as a percentage 
of that line. However, this methodology does not take large OOP into account 
(Doorslaer, et al., 2006). The following methodology is adopted (Xu, 2005) to reflect 
the poverty impact of OOP on conventional poverty estimates:       
A household is impoverished by OOP when its total spending falls below the 
poverty line after paying for health care. Therefore, the difference in the poverty 
headcounts before and after OOP for health reflects the poverty impact of OOP for 
health or what is called the impoverishment impact. A new dummy variable (      ) 
is created to examine the impoverishment impact of health payments. It equals one 
when total household spending falls below    after paying for health care. It equals 
zero otherwise.     
                                                                  
              
The thesis explores the impact of OOP for health on normalized poverty gap.  The 
normalized poverty gap is calculated before and after making OOP. The difference in 
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the normalized poverty gap reflects the impact of OOP on poverty intensity. 
Normalized poverty gap is calculated before OOP deduction as follows:  
                           
  
   
                             
 
   
 
Where   equals     less      for poor households; the gap equals zero for non-poor 
households.  
                              
Then the normalized poverty gap is recalculated after making OOP as follows:  
                           
       
   
 
   
 
Where        equals     less total household expenditure after making OOP for 
poor households including households that spend less than     after making OOP. 
Normalized poverty gap equals zero for non-poor households.  
                                                 
I compare the conventional normalized poverty gap to the normalized poverty gap 
after paying for health care. I use the World Bank developed software ADePT to 
calculate these measures. It is designed to simplify the calculation of poverty 
measures for raw disaggregated data sets.  
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Thesis Hypotheses  
The thesis tests the following hypotheses:  
1. Public health insurance protects households in the poorest quintile from 
catastrophic health expenditure.  
2. Poor household with chronic ill member is more likely to encounter 
catastrophic health expenditure compared to poor household with healthy 
member. 
3. Public health insurance protects households in the richest quintile from 
catastrophic health expenditure. 
4. Households with young children are more likely to encounter catastrophic 
health expenditure than households without young children.  
5. Households with employed household head are less likely to encounter 
catastrophic health payments than households with unemployed household 
head. 
6. Households with educated household head are less likely to face catastrophic 
health payments than uneducated household head. 
7. Households with private insurance coverage are less likely to face 
catastrophic payments compared to household without private insurance. 
8. Households with aged member are more likely to face catastrophic payments 
than households without aged member. 
9. Urban households are less likely to face catastrophic health expenditure than 
rural households.      
10. Male headed households are less likely to encounter catastrophic health 
expenditure. 
17 
 
IV. Health System Financing in Egypt 
The economic performance of all countries is influenced by the health of its 
citizens. According to the Egyptian constitution, free health care is a right to all 
citizens. The Government of Egypt (GOE) aims to ensure that health service is 
accessible when needed. It raises funds through taxes to protect citizens from 
financial hardship that may arise from health payments. Egypt Ministry of Health 
(MOH) provides free health care service to the public. Additionally, the Health 
Insurance Organization (HIO) pools health risk across a large proportion of 
population.  However, it aims to reach universal coverage in the long run.      
   The chapter explores the structure of health system financing in Egypt using 
the National Health Accounts (NHA) (Ministry of Health , Egypt, and Health Systems 
20/20, 2010). NHA provide a description to the monetary inflows and outflows in the 
health care system. The chapter assesses the commitment of GOE with respect to 
health care financing through a comparison between Egypt and lower middle income 
countries. It focuses on MOH financing system and HIO financing system, as they are 
the main public health providers. With the intention of designing policies that protect 
households from impoverishment by OOP, it is essential to explore the structure of 
OOP.        
Structure of Health System Financing in Egypt 
The health care system in Egypt provides health care service through three 
channels. These channels consist of government sector, private sector and civil 
society. The government sector refers to different ministries that provide health 
service such as MOH, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Defense and 
Ministry of Interior. Along with ministries, the government sector includes HIO and 
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the Curative Care Organization (CCO). They are financially independent 
organizations under the authority of MOH. The private sector refers to for profit 
hospitals, clinics, and pharmacies. The civil society consists of non-profit NGOs 
including religious health care providers. 
Figure 1-Health Financing in Egypt 2008 
 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF) is the main funding source for health care 
activities at different ministries. For instance, it funds 93% of MOH activities and 
72% of Ministry Higher Education health care activities. However, similar 
information is not available for Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior at NHA. 
MOF funds nearly one-third of total health spending. MOF distributes its funds across 
MOH, HIO and other public entities. In 2008, MOH spending represented 20% of 
total health spending while HIO spending accounted for 8% and 5% spent by other 
public health providers (Ministry of Health , Egypt, and Health Systems 20/20, 2010).   
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Public Health Spending in Egypt and Lower Middle Income Countries  
Egypt has one of the biggest shares of GDP dedicated to health spending 
among lower middle income countries. On the other hand, the share of public health 
spending in total health spending is the lowest among the selected lower middle 
income countries. While the share of public health expenditure in total public 
expenditure falls at the middle range compared to lower middle income countries 
(Table 2). 
Table 2- Health Financing in Lower Middle Income Countries 2008 
Country Public Health 
spending as a 
% GDP  
Public spending 
as % total 
health spending 
in 2008  
Public Health 
spending  (% of 
public 
spending)  
Public 
health 
spending 
per capita 
($)/ 2008 
 Sri Lanka 1.8 43.7 7.9 36.2 
Philippines 1.3 34.7 6.1 23.5 
Congo  1.4 49.9 5.3 40.4 
Egypt  2.0 33.0  5.9 37.0 
Indonesia  1.2 54.4 6.2 27.7 
Iraq  2.3 70.2 3.1 76.5 
Syria  1.2 38.8 4.6 27.5 
Morocco  1.9 36.3 6.6 47.0 
Source: World Bank and NHA 
Egypt has the largest population in the MENA region. GOE is one of the 
lowest spenders on health care in the region. Only the Syrian government spent less 
than GOE at per capita level. Therefore, it is likely that the extent of catastrophic 
health expenditure will be greater in Egypt than most of countries at the MENA 
region (Table 3).  
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Table 3- Health Care Spending in Egypt in Comparison to MENA region 2008 
Country Population 
(Million) 
public spending as 
% total health 
spending 
Public health 
spending per capita 
($)/ 2008 
Algeria 33.3 83.8 172.0 
Egypt 80.3 33.0  37.0 
Iran 65.3 45.7 134.0 
Jordan  6.0 62.2 170.0 
Lebanon  3.9 48.9 270.0 
Libya  6.0 75.8 291.0 
Morocco 33.7 34.9  47.0 
Syria 19.3 45.1  34.0 
Tunisia 10.2 49.5 106.0 
Source: NHA, 2007-08 and CIA World Factbook      
Ministry of Health  
MOH provides wide range of health service to all Egyptians. It raises funds 
from MOF, donations and self funding (Table 4). 
Table 4-Ministry of Health Funding Sources 2008 
Source In EGP (Million) % 
Ministry of Finance 8413.1  93 
Self funding 337.7   4 
Donations  250.8   3 
Total  9001.6 100 
Source: NHA, 2007/08 
MOH relies mainly on MOF resources to fund its activities. On the other hand, 
MOF has limited ability to raise funds from tax revenue because of the large size of 
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the informal economy and poverty (Schneider, 2002).  In 2008, MOH spending 
represented 1% of GDP.   
Health Insurance Organization 
HIO is an autonomous public organization under the supervision of MOH. It 
pools health risk across large segment of the population. The percentage of population 
covered by HIO has increased from 35% in 1995 to 55% in 2008. It covers school 
students, infants, pensioners and widows. Additionally, it targets employees through 
employment based scheme. Shawky describes the health insurance coverage as 
inequitable since it is skewed toward the richest quintiles and urban regions. This is 
mainly due to the large size of informal economy and the large proportion of 
population not working in Egypt (Shawky, 2010).  
HIO owns and operates an extensive infrastructure of hospitals, clinics and 
school clinics all over Egypt. It purchases and provides health care services 
simultaneously (Shawky & Mohamed, 2006). In 2008, HIO spending represented 8% 
of total health spending while SHI spending accounts for 15% in lower middle 
income countries (Gottret & Shieber, 2007). It raises funds from beneficiaries' 
payments, MOF and users’ fees (Figure 2).     
Figure 2-HIO Source of Funds 2008 
 
Source: NHA, 2007/08 
Premium & 
Contributions 
55% 
MOF 
18% 
Self Funds 
27% 
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  The health insurance system in Egypt does not meet beneficiaries' needs, as 
the majority of beneficiaries do not utilize it.  This is mainly due to the low cost 
ceiling that falls short of the expensive health services that rely on new technology 
(Shawky, 2010). Also public health care providers lack the incentives to serve patients 
at the best of their abilities since it's more lucrative to charge them directly at market 
prices at their private clinics (Gabili, 2010).  
Out-Of-Pocket Health Payments 
The share of OOP reflects the size of financial burden on households. The size 
of OOP is very high in Egypt relative to other lower middle income countries. The 
ratio of OOP per capita to public health per capita is the highest in Egypt (Table 5).  
Therefore, households of Egypt are overburden with OOP than most of other lower 
middle income countries.  
Table 5- Out-Of-Pocket Payments in Lower Middle Income Countries 2008 
Country OOP as a % of total 
health expenditure  
OOP per capita/ public 
health spending per 
capita 
 Sri Lanka 48.8 1.1 
Philippines 53.9 1.6 
Congo  50.1 1.0 
Egypt  60.0 1.8 
Indonesia  32.1 0.6 
Iraq  29.8 0.4 
Syria  61.2 1.6 
Morocco  55.0 1.5 
Source: World Bank and NHA 
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It is vital to examine the OOP structure to design polices that protect 
households from impoverishment by OOP. Private sector received 80% of 
households’ spending. Private clinics constituted the greatest share of OOP, which 
accounts for 22% of total health spending. Pharmaceuticals consume the second 
largest share of OOP followed by private hospitals (Figure 3).   
Figure 3- Structure of OOP 2008 
 
Source: NHA, 2007/08  
In Egypt, data from the Eighth Round of IDSC survey suggest that average 
OOP per household measured in Egyptian Pounds varies significantly across 
expenditure quintiles. It increases significantly from quintile to another (Table 6).  
The reason households in the richest quintile spend around 3.5 times households’ 
health spending in the poorest quintile is because the majority of households in the 
richest quintile are unsatisfied with public health facilities and they are willing to 
utilize and pay for private health facilities. On the other hand, poor households have 
to economize on their health spending and utilize free public health facilities. Forty 
Private Hospitals 
8% 
Private Clinics 
39% Pharmaceuticals 
33% 
Other 
20% 
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one percent of households are utilizing public health service either because it is free or 
because they cannot afford to utilize private health service. (Information and Decision 
Support Center, 2005). Seven percent of households in the poorest quintile do not 
purchase medicines because they cannot afford them while 4% of households in the 
second quintile do not buy their medicines (Table 7). This suggests the size of 
household’s OOP on health is a major determinant of the health of households in 
Egypt   
However, OOP to total household expenditure ratio does not vary significantly 
across quintiles, which suggests that the ratio is unrelated to the level of expenditure. 
On the other hand, OOP to     ratio declines rapidly across expenditure quintiles. The 
reason is that poor households have limited     unlike wealthy households. Even 
modest health payments may constitute a large portion of their     (Table 6).        
Table 6- OOP by Expenditure Quintiles 
Quintiles OOP 
Mean 
(EGP) 
95% CI Average OOP to 
total household 
expenditure (%) 
95% CI OOP to 
ctp (%) 
95% CI 
1 39.2 
38.0- 40.4 
7.0 
6.8-7.2 20.9 20.3-21.4 
2 55.4 
53.9- 56.8 
7.0 
6.8-7.2 19.3 18.8-19.8 
3 65.3 
63.5- 67.0 
7.3 
7.0-7.4 18.2 17.7-18.6 
4 83.4 
81.0- 85.7 
7.8 
7.5-8.0 16.7 16.2-17.2 
5 140.1 
135.4- 144.0 
7.4 
7.2-7.6 11.5 11.2-.11.8 
Total  78.0 
 
7.3 
 17.2 
 
 
The Eighth Round of IDSC survey asked households to evaluate medicines 
prices. Ironically, 1.4% of households in the richest quintile get free medicines while 
0.7% of households in the poorest quintile do. Moreover, 73.4% of households in the 
richest quintile view that medicines prices are reasonable while 54.6% of households 
in the poorest quintile do (Table 7).   
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Table 7-Evaluation of Medicines Prices on Households  
Quintiles Poorest Second Middle Fourth Richest 
N 2020 2135 2065 2038 2291 
Free (%) 0.7 0.6 1.2 0.8 1.4 
Fair Price (%) 54.6 55.4 57.5 62.7 73.4 
Expensive Price (%) 37.5 40.0 38.8 34.2 24.1 
Cannot afford to buy (%) 7.2 4.0 2.5 2.2 1.0 
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V. Econometric Analysis 
The first section of this chapter presents a socioeconomic and demographic 
profile of 10,550 households that were surveyed. The second section provides the 
extent of catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment while the third section 
presents the econometric results.       
A. Demographic and Socioeconomic Profile  
The socioeconomic and demographic profile distinguishes between household 
head and other household members. It provides the Child Dependency Ratio and the 
Age Dependency Ratio across the sample. The Child Dependency Ratio refers to the 
ratio of young dependents (less than 15 years) to the working age (between 15 years 
to 64 years) members. The Aged Dependency Ratio refers to the number of aged 
(above 64 years) dependents to the working age members (The World Bank, 2011). 
The profile divides households into quintiles according to their total monthly 
expenditure. It explores households’ possessions by their expenditure quintile to give 
a clear picture of households living conditions. Additionally, it describes the factors 
that are associated with high health care utilization. It examines the extent of health 
insurance coverage throughout the sample. The information presented in this profile 
will help in better understanding of the study results. 
The survey suggests that slightly more than the half of households live in rural 
areas. The average household size is nearly 4 members. Forty percent of households 
have children less than five years old while 14% of households have at least one aged 
member. The analysis suggests that the number of working age members is twice the 
number of non-working age members (Table 8). 
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Table 8- Households Composition by Residence, Size, and Dependency Ratios 
Household     Frequency Percentage  
Residence 
    Urban    4752    45.0 
    Rural     5798    55.0 
Household Size 
   1     602     5.7 
   2    1272    12.1 
   3    1812    17.2 
   4    2487    23.6 
   5    2292    21.7 
   6+    2085   19.8 
Household with children 4220 40.0 
 Households with aged 
member (more than 64) 
   1479   14.0 
Child Dependency Ratio                                                        50.0 
Aged Dependency Ratio                                                         6.0 
 
The majority of households are headed by males. Quarter of household heads 
are unemployed while nearly quarter work on irregular basis. Nearly more than 
quarter of household heads is uneducated and only 16% gone to university (Table 9). 
Table 9- Household Heads by Sex, Employment Status and Education 
Household Headship Frequency                                     Percentage 
Sex   
   Male    9276         88.0 
   Female     1274         12.0 
Employment Status 
   Unemployed      2568          24.3 
   Permanent employment     5495         52.1 
   Employed on irregular 
basis
2
  
    2487         23.5 
Education    
   No education     2902         27.5 
   Primary      1815         17.2 
   Preparatory      896          8.5 
   Secondary     2868         27.2 
   University Education or 
Higher 
    2068         19.6 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Employed on irregular basis consists of seasonal, temporary employment 
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Expenditure Quintiles  
 The expenditure quintile is constructed based on the adjusted per capita 
monthly expenditure. The household size is adjusted to take economics of scale of 
household consumption. Thus, the adjusted per capita monthly expenditure equals 
household total expenditure divided by the adjusted household size (      ), which is 
identified earlier  
                                           
                           
      
 
The data indicate the average adjusted per capita monthly expenditure is 536.4 
LE. The average household expenditure of the richest quintile is nearly four times of 
the poorest quintile. The average expenditure of the middle quintile is slightly higher 
than the second quintile. The average expenditure of the fourth quintile is 22% higher 
than the middle quintile (Table 10). On the other hand, the average adjusted per capita 
expenditure is nearly one half of the per capita income estimated by the World Bank 
for the same year (The World Bank, 2011). However, the unadjusted one would be 
lower, as the adjusted expenditure per capita takes the economies of scale of 
household consumption into account.         
Table 10- Expenditure Quintiles 
Quintiles N % 
Average 
monthly 
household 
expenditure   
95% CI 
Average 
adjusted per 
capita 
expenditure 
95% CI 
Poorest 2020  19.1 583.8 576.8- 590.7  246.2 244.3-248.0 
Second 2135 20.2 801.7 794.5- 808.8  348.0 347.1-348.9 
Middle 2065 19.6 930.2 921.9- 938.5  431.1 430.0-432.2 
Fourth 2038 19.3 1135.6 1120.4-1150.6  554.4 552.3-556.6 
Richest  2291 21.7 2059.4 2007.0-2111.7 1046.8 1022.9-1070.7 
Total  10550 100 1122.8 -  536.4 - 
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 The descriptive data analysis suggests more than half of rural households are 
in the poorest two quintiles while only 10.8% of rural households are in the richest 
quintile. This suggests that urban households represent that majority of the richest 
quintile. The proportion of rural households declines steadily across expenditure 
quintiles while the proportion of urban households increases progressively across 
expenditure quintiles (Table 11).   
Table 11- Expenditure Quintiles by Residence 
Quintiles             Urban                          Rural 
 N % N % 
Poorest 438 9.2 1582 27.3 
Second 658 13.8 1477 25.5 
Middle 897 18.9 1168 20.1 
Fourth 1091 23.0 948 16.3 
Richest 1667 35.1 624 10.8 
Total  4751 100.0 5799 100 
 The following table is developed to reflect households' ownership of assets to 
give more extensive description of households’ living.   
Table 12- Households' Possessions by Expenditure Quintiles 
Quintile Poorest  Second Middle Fourth Richest Total 
Household possessions % N 
  Refrigerator %  80.8 91.7 95.5 94.7 98.8 92.5 9757 
   Color TV % 83.2 91.1 95.4 94.2 98.2 92.6 9766 
   Air  
Conditioner % 
0.4 1.1 1.9 4.2 26.1 7.2 755 
   Stove % 62.9 74.3 81.1 84.0 93.4 79.5 8385 
   Water Heater 
% 
14.1 26.9 42.2 50.3 77.9 43.0 4539 
   Automatic 
Washing    
Machine % 
7.2 15.6 26.9 37.0 67.4 31.6 3332 
   Dishwasher 
% 
0 0.2 0.1 0.3 5.2 1.3 134 
   Satellite Dish 
% 
50.5 64.6 71.3 71.2 85.0 68.9 7270 
   Computer % 4.3 8.0 14.9 21.7 49.1 20.2 2133 
Internet 
Connection % 
0.7 1.5 4.1 7.1 27.0 8.5 894 
   Private Car % 0.2 1.1 2.3 4.0 27.2 7.4 780 
   Mobile 
Telephone % 
64.0 74.4 79.0 78.5 89.2 77.3 8156 
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A large proportion of households in the poorest quintile own refrigerator, color 
TV, mobile telephone and stove. Half of households in the poorest quintile own 
satellite dish while 64.1% of households in the second quintile own it. The majority of 
households own basic appliances, as more than 90% of all households own them.  
Additionally, 77.3% and 68.9% of households own mobile telephone and satellite dish 
respectively. They, however, forgo other basic products like water heater. This 
suggests that television, satellite dish and mobile phone turn out to be necessary 
products for Egyptian households. On the other hand, luxury appliances ownership is 
related to level of expenditure. For instance, less than 1% of households in the poorest 
quintile own air condition while 28.0% of households in the richest quintile own it.  
Only 1.3% of households in the poorest and second quintiles own private car while 
29.5% of households at the richest quintile own it (Table 12).  
Health Utilization and Health Expenditure  
 This section provides a descriptive analysis of factors that are associated with 
high health care service utilization. Households with children under five years are 
likely to utilize health care service frequently (Cavagnero, Xu, & Rivera, 2006). The 
proportion of households with children under five years declines steeply across 
quintiles.  The chi-square test asserts that there is a significant relation between the 
two variables. This suggests that poor households are likely to be larger than rich 
households (Table 13). 
Households with aged member tend to utilize health service regularly. Based 
on the chi-square test of significance, the proportion of households with aged member 
does vary significantly across expenditure quintiles. There is a significant relation 
between these two variables (Table 13). 
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Chronic illness is one of the key determinants of health care utilization. 
Ironically, the descriptive analysis suggests that chronic illness is less common among 
poor households than rich households. The proportion of households with chronic 
sickness rises significantly across expenditure quintiles (Table 13).   
Table 13- Household with Children, Aged, Chronic Sick member by Expenditure 
Quintiles 
Quintiles Poorest Second Middle Fourth Richest Chi square p-value 
N 2020 2135 2065 2038 2291   
Households with 
children less than 
five years (%) 
51.4 42.2 36.8 30.8 20.8 562.3 0.000 
Households with 
aged member (%) 
12.0 12.3 11.7 17.4 16.5 61.0 0.000 
Household with 
chronic sick 
member(s) % 
30.1 32.5 33.2 37.3 40.2 98.6 0.000 
   
The data indicate that 10% of households have at least one chronic sick 
member.  Heart diseases are the most common followed by diabetes (Figure 4).  
Figure 4 - Distribution of Diseases by Type   
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Distribution of Out-of-pocket Health Payments  
The upper curve in Figure 5 depicts the distribution of total households’ 
expenditure while the lower curve reflects the distribution of OOP on health. The 
graph suggests OOP do not affect the distribution of expenditure across households.   
OOP curve suggests that the share of the poorest two quintiles on total OOP on health 
is only 20% while the share of the richest quintile is 40%. Also the richest quintile 
spends four times the poorest quintile on health care.   
Figure 5- Lorenz Curve of OOP 
 
Health Insurance Coverage and Expenditure Quintiles 
 The analysis suggests that less than half of the population sample is covered 
by HIO. The HIO insurance coverage is pro-poor, as the proportion of households 
with at least one member covered by HIO declines significantly across quintiles. 
However, the converse is true for the private insurance coverage. Private insurance is 
not common in Egypt, where only 11% of households have at least one member 
covered by private insurance (Table 14).    
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Table 14- Equity of Insurance Coverage  
Quintiles Poorest Second Middle Fourth Richest Chi 
square 
p-value  
N 
2020 2135 2065 2038 2291   
HIO Coverage (%) 
85.5 82.3 80.9 73.4 74.9 133.3 0.000 
Private Insurance (%) 4.1 6.2 10.0 11.6 24.1 532.6 0.000 
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B. Catastrophic Health Expenditure  
Data analysis suggests that OOP drive 6% of households in Egypt to encounter 
catastrophic health expenditure. The results point out that catastrophic health 
expenditure influences households at all expenditure quintiles. However, the poorest 
quintile has the highest proportion while the richest quintile has the lowest proportion. 
The Chi-Square test suggests that there is a significant relation (Pearson chi-
square=151, p-value=0.000) between the extents of catastrophic health expenditure 
within each quintile and the ranking of the quintile, as households at the poorest 
quintile are more likely to encounter catastrophic health expenditure compared to 
other quintiles. The proportion of households encountering catastrophic health 
expenditure within the three middle quintiles is nearly identical. This can be attributed 
to a close level of expenditure across the three quintiles.  
Figure 6-Catastrophic Health Expenditure by Expenditure Quintiles 
 
Pearson Chi-Square=151, p-value=0.000 
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Impoverishment and Poverty Gap Results 
The estimated poverty line for a household composed of a single member 
equals LE 310 per month. This line is almost equivalent to $2 per day.  On the other 
hand, the food poverty line estimation is based on the cost of obtaining 2470 calories 
per day per person (Ministry of Economic Development , 2007). In 2010, Egypt 
Human Development Report suggested that the cost obtaining 1000 calories was 
nearly LE 2 (United Nations Development Progamme, 2010).  Food poverty line for a 
household composed of single member is, therefore, LE 5 per day or LE 150 per 
month.  However, for a household composed of four members, which is the average 
size of households in Egypt, the poverty line based on the adopted methodology 
would be LE 5.6 per day per household member. This reflects the reliability of the 
study's methodology. It also points out to the consistency of the IDSC dataset with 
other datasets.  
The conventional methodology of measuring poverty suggests that 19.1%
3
 of 
households spend below the poverty line. However, additional 7.4% of households 
fell below the poverty line after paying for health care. The extent of poverty, 
including those who are impoverished by health payment, is 26.5%. The proportion of 
impoverishment at poorest quintile is very low, as households in the poorest quintile 
already live below the poverty line. The impoverishment impact of health payments 
reaches to the middle quintile. None of households at the fourth and richest quintiles 
are impoverished by health payments. The second quintile has the highest proportion 
of households being pushed into poverty (Figure 7).   
                                                          
3
  The thesis estimate of the poverty headcount is very similar to the estimate of Egypt 
Ministry of Economic Development which is 19.9% (Egypt Ministry of Economic 
Development , 2008).  
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Figure 7- Impoverishment by Expenditure Quintiles 
 
  Pearson Chi-Square=2960, p-value=0.000  
Furthermore, OOP on health have exacerbated the normalized poverty gap. 
The conventional poverty gap is estimated to be 3.9%
4
 while the poverty gap after 
deduction of OOP is 5.3%. (an increase by 1.4%). This indicates a percentage point 
change by 36% as proportion of the conventional normalized poverty gap.  
Figure 8- Impact of OOP on Poverty Intensity  
 
                                                          
4
 The thesis estimate of the poverty gap is very close to the estimate of Egypt Ministry 
of Economic Development which is 4.2% (Egypt Ministry of Economic Development 
, 2008).  
99.9% 
0.0% 0.0% 
19.1% 
100.0% 
34.8% 
1.3% 
26.5% 
0.1% 
34.8% 
1.3% 
7.4% 
Poorest Second Middle Total  
Converntional Poverty headcount Poverty headcount after OOP Impoverishment 
3.90% 
5.30% 
1.40% 
Poverty gap 
Conventional Normalized Poverty Gap 
Normalized Poverty Gap after OOP Deductation  
Poverty Intensity Impact of OOP 
37 
 
Poverty Impact of Health Payments by Governorates  
OOP exacerbate poverty considerably across governorates. On average, OOP 
increase the conventional poverty headcount by 51.5%. In two governorates, OOP 
nearly doubles the poverty headcount. Twenty percent of households pushed into 
poverty by OOP in Qena, in six governorates, the impoverishment rate exceed 10%.  
In twelve governorates, the impoverishment rate ranges from 5% to 10%. Only in five 
governorates, the impoverishment rate is below 5% (Table 15).      
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Table 15- Impoverishment by Governorates 
Governorates Conventional 
Poverty 
headcount 
(%)  
 
Poverty 
headcount 
after OOP 
(%)  
Impoverishment 
(%) 
The 
percentage 
increase in 
poverty 
estimates (%) 
Governorates with High Impoverishment Rates (above 10%)  
Qena 21.5  42  20.5 95.3 
El Shrakia  14.6  26.2  11.6  79.5 
Aswan 21.0  32.3  11.3 53.8 
Beni Suef 37.0  48.1  11.1 30.0 
Dakahila 20.8  31.4  10.6  51.0 
Beheira 40.1  51.5  10.6  26.4 
Governorates with Moderate Impoverishment Rates (between 5%-10%)  
Asyut 33.3  43.0  9.7 29.1 
Suez 11.8  21.1  9.3  78.8 
Minya 30.2  38.9  8.7 28.8 
Faiyum  38.2  46.9  8.7 22.8 
Qalyubia  8.3  16.8  8.5  102.4 
Kafr El Sheikh 15.5  23.9  8.4  54.2 
Damietta  13.8  20.5 6.7  48.6 
Menufia  17.8  23.5  6.7  37.6 
Sohag  39.9  46.4  6.5 16.3 
Luxor 30.2 36.4 6.2 20.5 
Alexandria 7.3  12.4  5.1  69.9 
Ismailia 7.0  12.0  11.6  71.4 
Governorates with low Impoverishment Rates (below 5%)  
Gharbia 5.2 9.6 4.4 84.6 
Giza 11.5  15.3  3.8 33.0 
Alexandria 7.3  12.4  5.1  69.9 
Port Said 11.4  14.8  3.4  29.8 
Cairo 2.5 4.2  1.7  68.0 
 
39 
 
C. Econometric Results 
Econometric Results for Households in the Poorest Quintile   
The results suggest that the place of residence does not influence the risk of 
encountering catastrophic health expenditure significantly. The sex of household head 
does not have a significant impact on the probability of facing catastrophic health 
expenditure. Male headed household is not a protective factor against catastrophic 
expenditure than female headed household. However, household with employed 
household head are less likely to face catastrophic payment than household with 
unemployed head. Educated household head does not reduce the risk of catastrophic 
expenditure. Households with at least one member covered by private insurance are 
not protected against catastrophic expenditure compared to households without 
private insurance. Large households are more protected against catastrophic 
expenditure compared to small households. Aged member(s) does not increase the 
probability of encountering catastrophic payments. Results suggest that public health 
insurance does protect poor households from facing financial hardship. Chronic 
illness is the highest risk factor for catastrophic health expenditure. For poor 
households having young children (less than five years old) is another risk factor for 
catastrophic health expenditure (Table 16).   
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Table 16- Logistic Regression of the Poorest Quintile  
Independent Variable Odds Ratio 95% CI P-value 
Place of Living (X1)                                                                                                 0. 19 
Urban 1   
Rural 1.33 0.86-2.06  
Sex of Household Head (X2)                                                                                     0.38 
Male 1   
Female 0.78 0.44-1.36  
Household Head Employment status (X3)                                                              0.000 
Yes 1   
No 2.23 1.40-3.52  
Educated Household Head (X4)                                                                                0.34 
Yes 1   
No 1.20 0.81-1.78  
Private Insurance (X5)                                                                                              0.35 
Yes 1   
No 1.79 0.52-6.15  
Household Size (X6) 0.75 0.66-0.85      0.000 
Age Dep Ratio (X7) 1.44 0.77-2.69     0.25 
Public Insurance (X8) 0.10 0.03-0.26     0.000 
Chronic Ill (X9) 10.2 4.50-23.3     0.000 
Child (X10) 1.62 1.20-2.18     0.000 
Negelkerke R-square=0.25 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test p-value=0.521  
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Econometric Results for Households in the Richest Quintile   
Urban households are more protected against catastrophic payments than rural 
households. This suggests that the poverty effect dominates the residence effect in the 
poorest quintile. Sex of household head is not a determinant of catastrophic 
expenditure. Unlike poor households, employed household head does not decrease the 
risk of catastrophic health payments. This indicates that the high expenditure level in 
this quintile dominates the working status effect.  Education status of household head 
does not protect rich households from catastrophic payments. Private insurance does 
not protect households from catastrophic health expenditure. Unlike poor households, 
large household size is not a protective factor against catastrophic expenditure. The 
reason is that it is common for large poor households to employ their young members 
unlike rich households (United Nations Childern's Fund, 2010). Unlike poor 
households, having aged member or young children do not increase the likehood of 
facing catastrophic payments for households in the richest quintile. This suggests that 
poor households are more sensitive to factors that are associated with health 
payments. Unlike poor households, public insurance does not protect households from 
catastrophic payments. This reflects the fact that many households at the richest 
quintile do not utilize public health facilities. The results assert that household with 
chronic ill member is very likely to encounter catastrophic health payments (Table 
17). 
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Table 17- Logistic Regression of the Richest Quintile 
Independent Variable Odds Ratio 95% CI P-value 
Place of Living (X1)                                                                                               0. 008 
Urban 1   
Rural 3.35 1.36-8.20  
Sex of Household Head (X2)                                                                                     0.67 
Male 1   
Female 0.78 0.24-2.50  
Household Head Employment status (X3)                                                               0.100 
Yes 1   
No 2.42 0.84-6.98  
Educated Household Head (X4)                                                                                0.34 
Yes 1   
No 2.39 0.90-6.33  
Private Insurance (X5)                                                                                               0.40 
Yes 1   
No 1.92 0.41-8.84  
Household Size (X6) 1.14 0.77-1.70    0.49 
Age Dep Ratio (X7) 1.31 0.44-3.38    0.623 
Public Insurance (X8) 0.64 0.47-7.56     0.36 
Chronic Ill (X9) 13.3 2.85-62.2     0.001 
Child (X10) 0 -     0.99 
Negelkerke R-square=0.22 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test p-value=0.64  
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Econometric Analysis for the Complete Sample  
The model results show that several variables are associated with catastrophic 
health expenditure. The results suggest that urban households are more protected 
against catastrophic health expenditure than rural households. Female headed 
household is more protected from catastrophic health expenditure. Results suggest 
that in the extreme quintiles, the expenditure level dominates the effect of the sex of 
household head. Working household head is a protective factor against catastrophic 
expenditure. The level of education of household heads is not a significant 
determinant of catastrophic health expenditure. Employment matters more than 
education in protecting households against catastrophic health expenditure.    
Households that have at least one member covered by private insurance are 
less likely to face catastrophic payments than uninsured households. The Results 
suggest private insurance matters more for the middle quintiles than extreme quintiles. 
All expenditure quintiles are more vulnerable to face catastrophic payments compared 
to the richest quintile. Households at the poorest quintile are the most vulnerable to 
catastrophic payments. As household moves from one quintile to another, it becomes 
relatively more protected against catastrophic payments.                  
Large households are less likely to encounter catastrophic health expenditure 
than small households. The reason is that large households take advantage of 
economies of scale of household consumption. In addition, large households have 
more working members than small households. The model suggests that having aged 
member is a risk factor for catastrophic health expenditure. Public health insurance 
protects households from catastrophic health expenditure. As the number of insured 
members increase within the household, the more protected is the household. The 
analysis suggests that chronic illness represents a high risk factor. Households with 
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young children (less than five years) are more likely to face financial catastrophe than 
households without young children.   
 The variable X12 reflects the interaction between two variables: the number 
young children (X11) and chronic sick ratio (X10). Households with children and 
chronic sick member are more likely to encounter catastrophic payments than 
households with young children, as expressed in the difference in their odds ratios.  
The variable X13 reflects the interaction between two variables; expenditure quintiles 
(X6) and chronic sick ratio (X10). The model’s results suggest that poor households 
with chronic sick member(s) face the highest risk of encountering catastrophic 
expenditure, as reflected by the high odds ratios (Table 18).  
 The above results share some similarities with a study using the same 
methodology that was conducted for Argentina, which is an upper middle income 
country. In both countries results suggest that aged member increases the likehood of 
catastrophic expenditure, employed household head protects from catastrophic 
payments, and households in the richest quintile are the most protected relative to 
other quintile. However, in the Argentinean case, young children do not increase the 
risk of facing catastrophic payments. Unlike Egypt, education in Argentina protects 
households from catastrophic payments (Cavagnero, Xu, & Rivera, 2006).   
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Table 18- Logistic Regression for Catastrophic Health Expenditure 
Independent Variable Coef Odds Ratio 95% CI P-value 
Place of Living (X1)                                                                                                                           0. 000 
Urban 1    
Rural 0.55 1.73 1.38-2.17  
Sex of Household Head (X2)                                                                                                               0.029 
Male 1    
Female -0.33 0.71 0.52-0.96  
Household Head Employment status (X3)                                                                                          0.000 
Yes 1    
No 0.83 2.307 1.80-2.95  
Educated Household Head (X4)                                                                                                            0.77 
Yes 1    
No -.033 0.96 0.77-1.20  
Private Insurance (X5)                                                                                                                         0.000 
Yes 1    
No 1.00 2.74 1.55-4.82  
Expenditure quintiles (X6)                                                                                                                  0.000 
Poorest 2.37 10.73 5.19-22.1  
Second 1.87 6.50 3.13-13.4  
Middle 1.47 4.36 2.07-9.1  
Fourth 1.36 3.93 1.86-8.3  
Household Size (X7) -0.24 0.78 0.72-0.84    0.000 
Age Dep Ratio (X8) 0.39 1.48 1.12-1.96    0.006 
Public Insurance (X9) -1.58 0.20 0.12-0.32     0.000 
Chronic Ill (X10) 1.62 5.08 1.78-14.4     0.002 
Child (X11) 0.30 1.36 1.11-1.66     0.003 
Change in number of children 
in a household with chronic 
member (X12) 
0.58 1.78  
 
Household with Chronic sick by expenditure quintiles (X13)                                                           
Chronic by Q1  2.58 13.22   
Chronic by Q2 2.74 15.50   
Chronic by Q3 2.46 11.71   
Chronic by Q4 2.27 9.68   
Negelkerke R-square=0.26 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test p-value=0.15 
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Chronic Disease and Catastrophic Health Expenditure    
According to results, chronic disease represents an important risk factor for 
catastrophic health payments. Thirty one percent of households that encounter 
catastrophic health expenditure have at least one chronic sick member. Eight percent 
of households with at least one member suffering from heart disease are facing 
catastrophic health payments while 7% of households with at least one member 
suffering from diabetes are encountering catastrophic health expenditure. Moreover, 
7% of households with at least one member suffering from bone illness are facing 
catastrophic health expenditure (Figure 9). 
Figure 9- Catastrophic Health Expenditure and Chronic Disease 
 
  
 The analysis suggests that 30% of impoverished households have at least one 
member with chronic illness. Nine percent of households with at least one member 
suffering from brain sick member are impoverished by health payments while 8% of 
households with at least one member suffering heart disease are impoverished by 
health payments (Figure 9).      
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Figure 10- Impoverishment and Chronic Disease  
 
 A small percentage (6%) of households that have at least one chronic sick 
member are facing catastrophic payment. However, households encountering 
catastrophic payments are more likely to have chronic sick member.     
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VI. Policy Implications and Conclusion 
The size of catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment in Egypt are 
higher than many lower middle income countries. For instance, the size of 
impoverishment in some poor Asian countries like Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka 
did not exceed 3.8% (Doorslaer, et al., 2006), which is a slightly higher than the half 
of the extent of impoverishment in Egypt. This thesis argues that reducing reliance on 
OOP and increasing public health investments would not only increase access to 
health care and subsequently improve citizens’ health but also would protect 
households from financial risks arising from health payments. Based on the thesis’s 
findings, I suggest some board policy areas that aim to protect households from 
catastrophic health payments and impoverishment (Table 19).   
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Table 19- Strategies for Protecting Households against Catastrophic Payments 
and Impoverishment in Egypt 
1. Developing an exemption scheme for households that are likely to face 
catastrophic expenditure based on the model findings. This includes: 
 Poor households with chronic sick member. 
 Households with at least chronic sick member and young children.  
 Uninsured poor households.    
2. Developing new public health facilities in governorates with high 
impoverishment rates such as Qena and El Sharkia. 
3. Increase Pubic Investment in Health through:  
 Increase the health share on the government budget. 
 Earmarked taxes on tobacco and alcohol for health. 
 Earmarked taxes on polluting industries. 
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Literature suggests that the share of government spending on health as 
opposed to the share of OOP on health is key determinants of the size of catastrophic 
health payments across countries. Health financing system in Egypt is facing 
numerous obstacles that challenge the goal of providing free health care as suggested 
by the constitution. The GOE is one of the lowest spenders on health care across 
lower middle income countries. Additionally, the poor quality of public health care 
service pushes households to expensive private health providers.  The national health 
insurance does not cope with beneficiaries’ needs or protects households from 
financial risks associated with illness. This suggests that Egypt possesses an 
environment conducive to the growth of catastrophic health expenditure.   
Households at different expenditure quintiles are all subject to catastrophic 
health expenditure with different degrees. OOP drive 6% of all households to 
encounter financial catastrophe. The poorest quintile is most unprotected against 
catastrophic payments. The analysis suggests that 7.4% of households fell below the 
poverty line after paying for health care. More than one third of households at the 
second quintile have pushed into poverty because of health payments. OOP have 
exacerbated the poverty gap as well. The poverty effect of OOP has exacerbated the 
poverty gap by 1.4%.  In effect, OOP have exacerbated the poverty estimates but they 
have not influence the income distribution.   
 The econometric analysis suggests that factors such as level of household 
expenditure, working status of household head, insurance coverage, and chronic 
illness are all related to catastrophic health expenditure. Polices such as developing an 
exemption scheme for poor households with chronic sick member are needed to 
reduce the extent of catastrophic payments and impoverishment.   
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     The thesis opens the field for future research on the optimum amount of funds 
that are needed for achieving universal health coverage in Egypt. Future research 
should assess the efficacy of untraditional health financing mechanisms on protecting 
households against catastrophic health expenditure and impoverishment. These 
untraditional mechanisms include micro banking on health, social capital and 
community based health insurance.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
VII. References 
Abou-Ali, H. (2007). Out-Of-Pocket Payments for Health Care: The Case of Egypt, 1999-2005 . 
Institutions and Economic Development (p. 21). Cairo: Economic Research Forum. 
Carrin. (2002). Social Health Insurance in Developing Countries: A Continuing Challenge. 
International Social Security Review . 
Cavagnero, C., Xu, & Rivera. (2006). Health Financing in Argentina: an Empirical Study of 
Health Care Expenditure and Utilization. Innovations in Health Financing. 
Cavagnero, Carrin, Xu, & Aguilar-Rivera. (2006). Health Financing in Agentina: An Empirical 
Study of Health Care Expenditure and Utilication. Innovation in Health Financing. 
Central Intelligence Agency. (2008). Population 2008 Country Ranks. Retrieved October 19, 
2011, from The World Factbook 2008: 
http://www.photius.com/rankings/population/population_2008_0.html 
Doorslaer, O'Donnell, Rliya, Samanathan, Adhikari, Garg, et al. (2006). Effect of Payments for 
Health Care on Poverty Estimates in 11 Countries in Asia: an Analysis of household survey 
data. The Lancet , 1357-1364. 
Egypt Ministry of Economic Development . (2008). Egypt Achieving the Millenium 
Development Goals a Midpoint Assement . UNDP. 
El Gazzar, H. (2009). Income and the Use of Health Care: An Empirical Study of Egypt and 
Lebanon. Health Economics, Policy and Law , 445-478. 
Fouad, S. (2005). Egypt National Health Accounts 2001-02. Partners for Health Reformplus. 
Gabali, H. E. Egyptian Health Policy, Present and Future Challenges and Opportunities. The 
American University in Cairo . 
Gabili, H. E. (2010, December 29). Egyptian Health Policy, Present and Future Challenges and 
Opportunities . 
Gazzar, E., Raad, Arfa, Mataria, Salti, Chaaban, et al. (2010). Who Pays? Out-of-Pocket Health 
Spending and Equity Implications in the Middle East and North Africa. .  
Gericke. (2005). Financing health care in Egypt: current issues and options for reform. Public 
Health , 26-36. 
Gottret, & Shieber. (2007). Health Financing Revisited:An Overview. Cairo: The Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies. 
Gupta, & Verhoeven:Tiongson. (2003). Public Spending on health care and the poor. Health 
Economics , 685-696. 
Hanafy, E., Omar, B., & Saleh, C. (2010). The Economics of Tobacco and Tobacco Taxation in 
Egypt. World Health Organization. 
53 
 
Information and Decision Support Center. (2005). Evaluation of the Health Status in Egypt 
based on The Social Contract Survey 2005. Cairo: IDSC. 
James, & Carrin. (2005). Social Health Insurance: Key Factors Affecting the Transition 
Towards Universal Coverage. International Social Security Review , 45-64. 
Ke Xu, D. B., Carrin, G., & Ana Mylena, A.-R. (2007). Protecting Households From 
Catastrophic Health Spending. Health Affairs , 972-983. 
Ke Xu, E., Kawabata, Kei, Zeramdini, R., & Klavus, C. J. (2003). Househiold catastrophic health 
expenditure: a multicountry analysis. The Lancet , 111-117. 
Leive, & Xu. (2008). Coping with out-of-pocket health payments: empirical evidence from 15 
African countries. Bulletin of the World Health Orgainization , pp. 849-856. 
Ministry of Economic Development . (2007). Poverty Report.  
Ministry of Health , Egypt, and Health Systems 20/20. (2010). National Health Accounts 
2007/2008: Egypt.  
Ministry of Health , Egypt, and Health Systems 20/20. (2010). National Health Accounts 
2007/2008: Egypt.  
Ministry of Health and Population, E. Z. (2002). Egypt Service Provision Assessment Survey 
2002 .  
Narayan, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Schulte. (2000). Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear 
Us? New York: Oxford University Press. 
Normand, & Thomas. (2009). Health Care Financing and the Health System. In Carrin, Buse, 
Heggenhougen, & Quah, Health Systems Policy, Finance, and Organization (pp. 149-163). 
Elsevier. 
O'Donnell, V. D. (2007). Analyzing Health Equity using household data. World Bank Institue . 
Russell, S. (2004). The Economic Burden of Illness for Households in Developing Countries:A 
Review of Studies Focusing on Malaria, Tuberculosis, and Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome. American Journal of Tropical Medicine and 
Hygiene71 , 147-155. 
Schneider, F. (2002). Size and Mesurament of the Informal Economy in 110 Countries. 
Workshop of Australian National Tax Centre.  
Shawky. (2010). Could the employment -based targeting approach serve Egypt in moving 
toward a social health insurance model? Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal , 663-670. 
Shawky, S., & Mohamed, S. (2006). Health Insurance in Egypt: Social Contract Survey 2005. 
Cairo. 
54 
 
The Information and Decision Support Center. (2010 йил September). Bank of Surveys. 
Retrieved 2011 йил 22-October from IDSC: 
http://surveysbank.org.eg/Cod_Surveys/SurveyDetails_dtl.aspx?Survey_id=35 
The Information and Decision Support Center. (2010). Bank of Surveys. Retrieved 2011 йил 
22-October from The Eighth Round of the Egyptian Family Observatory Survey: 
http://surveysbank.org.eg/Cod_Surveys/SurveyDetails_dtl.aspx?Survey_id=350 
The Information and Decision Support Center. (2010). Bank of Surveys. Retrieved October 1, 
2011, from The Seventh Round of the Egyptian Family Observatory Survey: 
http://surveysbank.org.eg/Cod_Surveys/SurveyDetails_dtl.aspx?Survey_id=35 
The Information and Decision Support Center. (2005). Challenges facing the Health Sector in 
Egypt and Policies to Overcome them. Cairo. 
The World Bank. (2011). Age Dependency Ratio. Retrieved October 28, 2011, from Data: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.DPND.OL?page=5 
The World Bank. (2007). Arab Republic of Egypt Poverty Assessment Update. The World 
Bank. 
The World Bank. (n.d.). Data. Retrieved October 19, 2011, from Indicators: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD 
The World Bank. (2011). Poverty Reducation & Equity . Retrieved 12 15, 2011, from The 
World Bank: 
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/0,,menuPK:336998~pagePK:1
49018~piPK:149093~theSitePK:336992,00.html 
The World Bank. (2011). The World Bank. Retrieved November 5, 2011, from Data: 
http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic 
The World Health Organization. (2005). Achieving universal health coverage: developing the 
health financing system. The World Health Organization. 
The World Health Organization. (2011). Egypt Country Statistics . Retrieved July 2, 2011, 
from Global Health Observatory Data Repository: 
http://apps.who.int/ghodata/?theme=country# 
United Nations Development Progamme. (2010). Egypt Human Development Report 2010.  
Van Doorslaer, O., Eliya, Garg, Huq, NG, W., Tao, et al. (2007). Catastrophic Payments for 
Health Care in Asia. Health Economics , 1159-1184. 
Wagstaff. (2007). The economic consequences of health shocks:Evidence from Vietnam. 
Journal of Health Economics , 82-100. 
Wagstaff, A., & Doorslaer, V. (2002). Catastrophe and Impoverishment in Paying for Health 
Care: with application to Vietnam 1993-1998. Health Economics , 921-934. 
55 
 
World Health Organization. (2009). World Health Statistics. Genva : World Health 
Organization . 
Xu. (2005). Distribution of health payments and catastrophic payments methodology. Genva: 
World Health Organization. 
Xu, E., Kawabata, Kei, Zeramdini, R., & Klavus, C. J. (2003). Househiold catastrophic health 
expenditure: a multicountry analysis. The Lancet , 111-117. 
Xu, K. (2005). Distribution of Health Payments and Catastrophic Expenditures Methodology . 
Genva: World Health Organization. 
 
 
